Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Language rules, philosophy: the question here is whether rules for the use of language are possible or useful at all. Some authors acknowledge them for the definition of reference (reference objects), but not for meanings. See also language acquisition, language, language games, reference. meaning._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Isabel C. Hungerland on Language Rules - Dictionary of Arguments
I 321 Rules/Hungerland: rules are only useful if they are formulated according to actions that can be considered a standard. I 322 What is the essence of logical absurdity? Is it the negation of context implication? How does it differ from the logical contradiction? I 323 As a linguistic action it is rather ineffective or absurd, when one part withdraws the other. I 324 Absurdity of an action is rather cultural-specific than a logical absurdity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Hungerland I Isabel C. Hungerland Contextual Implication, Inquiry, 3/4, 1960, pp. 211-258 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
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> Counter arguments against Hungerland
> Counter arguments in relation to Language Rules
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28